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GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: 
CALIFORNIA’S PROP. 50 TURNS THE 
CONCEPT OF DUE PROCESS ON ITS HEAD 
Brantley I. Pepperman* 
           
     For decades, “good governance” has been little more 
than a talking point for politicians on the road to reelection 
or a promotion to higher office.  In 2014, the California 
Legislature attempted to give teeth to the idea, successfully 
spearheading an amendment to the California Constitution 
approved by voters in 2016.  But despite its efforts to “drain 
the swamp,” the Legislature gave itself a powerful tool, the 
authority to suspend or expel legislators without pay, that 
presents more problems than solutions.  This article explores 
the implications of that amendment, including the extent to 
which it, as codified, comports with procedural due process 
requirements.  In so doing, the article proposes several 
changes that would further insulate the amendment from a 
legal attack. 
  
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., International 
Relations, University of Southern California.  Many thanks to Professors Lee Petherbridge, Adam 
Zimmerman, and Lauren Willis for their guidance and encouragement and the members of Loyola 
of Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work and dedication.  Finally, I wish to acknowledge my 
friends and family, including my father, Don, and my grandfather, Max.  All that I know about the 
law I know because of them. 
 
PEPPERMAN_V.8 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/19  7:57 PM 
610 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:609 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.   INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 612 
II.  TRACING PROP. 50’S ORIGINS AND ITS CONFLICT WITH 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ................................................ 615 
A.  Prop. 50 Generally ........................................................ 615 
1.  It Is No Coincidence That Prop. 50 Was on the Ballot 
as a “Legislatively Referred” Constitutional 
Amendment and that Senator Steinberg Is Its Author
 616 
2.  Prop. 50 Emerged Because the Legislature Could Not 
Suspend Three “Corrupt” Politicians Without Pay ... 617 
3.  The Legislative Counsel Opinion ............................. 620 
B.  Procedural Due Process Generally ................................. 621 
1.  Due Process Requires Notice and the Opportunity to be 
Heard ...................................................................... 621 
2.  Property Under the Due Process Clauses.................. 622 
3.  The Mathews Test .................................................... 623 
4.  Notice and Hearing Requirements Post Gilbert ........ 624 
III.  PROP. 50 DOES NOT PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER AS WRITTEN
 ........................................................................................... 625 
A.  A Legislator’s Pay is “Property” Within the Meaning of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . 625 
1.  Article III, Section 4 of the California Constitution  
Mandates that The Salaries of State Legislators  May 
Not Be Reduced During Their Term of Office ......... 626 
2.  Prop. 50’s “Notwithstanding” Language Does Not 
Destroy Legislators’ Property Interest in Pay ........... 628 
B.  Prop. 50 Provides Insufficient Notice and Hearing 
Procedures.................................................................... 630 
1.  The Plain Language of Article IV, Section 5 Makes  No 
Mention of the Notice Provided to a Legislator Facing 
Suspension Without Pay .......................................... 631 
2.  The Plain Language of Article IV, Section 5  Makes No 
Mention of the Hearing Provided  to a Legislator 
Facing Suspension Without Pay............................... 632 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS ............................................................ 633 
A.  Requirement of Written Notice ..................................... 634 
B.  Guarantee of Hearing .................................................... 634 
1.  Particular Procedures ............................................... 635 
PEPPERMAN_V.8 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/19  7:57 PM 
2018] RETHINKING PROP. 50 611 
2.  Timing of the Hearing.............................................. 635 
C.  Imposition of a Time Limit on Duration of the Suspension
 ..................................................................................... 636 
D.  Limitation on the Applicability of the Proposition ......... 637 
V.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PROPOSAL ......................................... 637 
A.  Constitutional Concerns Mitigated ................................ 637 
1.  Loss of a Legislator’s Salary is a Significant Private 
Interest at Stake ....................................................... 638 
2.  The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation is High Because 
Prop. 50 Presently Provides Insufficient Safeguards, 
and the Proposed Additional Protections Would 
Reduce this Risk ...................................................... 640 
3.  The Proposed Additional Protections Would Impose 
Little to No Additional Fiscal and/or Administrative 
Burdens on the Government .................................... 642 
B.  Furtherance of Policy Goals .......................................... 644 
C.  Methods of Enacting Proposed Changes ........................ 644 
VI.  CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 645 
 
  
PEPPERMAN_V.8 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/19  7:57 PM 
612 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:609 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
From the comfort of a dimly lit, smoke-filled backroom, 
California political boss Jesse “Big Daddy” Unruh said that “[m]oney 
is the mother’s milk of politics.”1 Thanks to a recent amendment to 
the California Constitution, former Assemblyman Roger Hernández 
faced the crippling loss of this essential nutrient. Voters authorized 
Proposition 50, which allows either house of the Legislature to 
suspend members without pay, eviscerating fundamental notions of 
due process along the way.2 
Hernández’s political career began when, at the age of 
twenty-four, he was elected to the Rowland Unified School District 
Board of Education in 1999.3 The son of working-class immigrant 
parents, Hernández was the first in his family to attend college.4 
Hernández continued making history when he became the youngest 
person sworn in as a member of the West Covina City Council in 
2003.5 He went on to serve as mayor of West Covina, before being 
elected to represent constituents of the 48th Assembly District in the 
California State Assembly in November 2010.6 There, Hernández 
served as the chairman of the Assembly Labor and Employment 
Committee and enjoyed other plum posts on the influential 
appropriations and governmental organization committees until July 
1, 2016.7 
Hernández and Baldwin Park City Council member Susan Rubio 
were married in June 2013, and Rubio filed for divorce proceedings in 
2014.8 During the divorce proceedings, Rubio alleged that Hernández 
 
 1. Mark A. Uhlig, Jesse Unruh, a California Political Power, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 
1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/06/obituaries/jesse-unruh-a-california-political-power-
dies.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2. See California Proposition 50, Legislator Suspension Amendment, BALLOTPEDIA.ORG 
(June 2016),  https://ballotpedia.org/California_Propo sition_50,_Legislator_Suspension 
_Amendment_(June_2016); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5. At times, this constitutional provision will 
be referred to as “Prop. 50.” 
 3. Full Biography for Roger Hernandez, SMART VOTER: LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS (June 
8, 2010), http://www.smartvoter.org/2010/06/08/ca/state/vote/hernandez_r/bio.html. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Roger Hernandez’s Biography, VOTE SMART: FACTS MATTER, https://votesmart.org  
/candidate/biography/71156/roger-hernandez#.WfOxN1tSzct. 
 7. Jim Miller, Assemblyman Removed From Committee Posts over Claims He Abused His 
Wife, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 1, 2016, 7:54 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
government/capitol-alert/article87326447.html. 
 8. Richard Winton, Judge Orders West Covina Assemblyman to Stay Away from Wife 
Following Domestic Violence Allegations, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016, 9:41 AM), 
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had pushed, shoved, hit, and choked her, culminating in a judge 
granting Rubio a temporary restraining order against Hernández in 
April 2016.9 That restraining order was extended for a period of three 
years in July.10 Assemblyman Hernández was not “termed out” from 
his various committee assignments; rather, he was forcibly removed 
by Assembly Speaker Anthony Rendon after these graphic allegations 
of domestic abuse in Hernández’s personal life surfaced.11 
This most-recent legal issue in his once-promising career is not 
the first that Hernández has faced.12 Nor is it the first time that 
Hernández and his supporters have urged critics to respect the concept 
of “due process” pending the completion of investigations into 
Hernández’s alleged misconduct.13 
In 2007, a neighbor reported hearing a loud argument, prompting 
police to respond to Hernández’s home.14 No charges were filed after 
Hernández claimed that the report was politically motivated.15  
In August 2012, a jury acquitted Hernández of drunk driving 
charges stemming from an incident in March of that year where 
Hernández was driving a state-owned car on a personal trip.16 At the 
time of Hernández’s arrest, then-Speaker John A. Perez remarked that 
like “all Californians, Assembly members deserve due process[.]”17  
In October 2012, Hernández was again accused of domestic 
violence in relation to a July incident where he allegedly hit a woman 
 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-assemblyman-roger-hernandez-domestic-violence-
allegations-20160414-story.html. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Javier Panzar, Judge OKs Restraining Order Against Assemblyman Roger Hernández, 
L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2016, 5:44 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-essential-
politics-updates-judge-oks-restraining-order-against-1467418373-htmlstory.html. 
 11. Miller, supra note 7. 
 12. Id. 
 13. To be clear, this Article renders no judgment as to Hernández’s guilt or innocence in regard 
to any past, present, or future allegations. The history of Mr. Hernández is used for the sole purpose 
of illuminating the due process concerns inherent in applying the provisions of Prop. 50 to an 
individual who has not been charged with a crime. 
 14. Michael J. Mishak & Teresa Watanabe, L.A. County Sheriff to Take Over Abuse Probe of 
Assemblyman, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012, 5:55 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/ 
10/la-sheriff-to-take-over-abuse-investigation-against-west-covina-assemblyman.html. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Patrick McGreevy, Assemblyman Roger Hernandez Found not Guilty of Driving Drunk, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2012, 11:55 AM) http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-
politics/2012/08/assemblyman-roger-hernandez-verdict.html. 
 17. Henry K. Lee, Assemblyman Apologizes for DUI Arrest in Concord, S.F. GATE (Sept. 18, 
2012, 4:20 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Assemblyman-apologizes-for-DUI-arrest-
in-Concord-3509643.php. 
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with a belt and slammed her into a wall, though no charges were 
filed.18 At the time, Hernández claimed that the charges were 
politically motivated.19  
For several years, Hernández was probed by the state Fair 
Political Practices Commission for allegedly laundering $100,000 in 
campaign funds during his 2010 run for State Assembly, but he has 
denied any impropriety.20 Citing the death of one key witness and the 
poor medical condition of another, the ethics agency ended the probe 
in December 2015 without filing charges.21 
After repeatedly facing and successfully defeating allegations of 
wrongdoing throughout his career, Assemblyman Hernández again 
faced punishment by his peers in the Legislature in the form of 
deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest: his 
salary.22 This is despite the fact that Hernández has not been charged 
with any crime.23 Prop. 50 allows lawmakers to suspend their 
colleagues and withhold pay without providing notice, an opportunity 
to be heard, or any coherent criteria for determining when such a 
reprimand is appropriate.24 This Article argues that Prop. 50. is both 
bad law and bad public policy. 
Part II provides a brief background on Prop. 50, detailing what is 
required to suspend a legislator without pay and describing the 
Proposition’s origins. It will then trace the jurisprudence of “property” 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and summarize trends in judicial decisions as to what 
specific procedures are due. 
Part III contends that Prop. 50 is unconstitutional under the 
United States Constitution as currently written. First, it does not 
provide sufficient procedures for legislators to challenge their 
suspension of pay, as it does not provide notice or an opportunity to 
be heard. Second, Prop. 50 is impermissibly vague, lending it to 
 
 18. Mishak, supra note 14. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Patrick McGreevy, Ethics Agency Drops Case Against Assemblyman Roger Hernandez 
Citing Death of Witness, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015, 11:55 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/ 
la-pol-sac-ethics-agency-drops-case-story.html. 
 21. Id. 
 22. The Times Editorial Board, Legislators Can Suspend Assemblyman Roger Hernandez 
Without Pay. But Should They?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
opinion/editorials/la-ed-roger-hernandez-prop50-20160804-snap-story.html. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. 
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overbroad application beyond its original intent because the language 
does not specify the circumstances in which it can be used. Therefore, 
it could be used against a member who simply expresses unpopular 
views, or against a member who has not yet been charged with a crime. 
Part IV recommends changes to the language of Prop. 50 that 
would: 1) limit Prop. 50’s application to situations where a member 
has been charged and/or convicted of a crime; 2) require written notice 
to an accused member that a vote to suspend the member without pay 
will take place; 3) guarantee a hearing so that legislators can mount a 
fair defense, the timing of which turns on the nature of the crime the 
member is accused of; and 4) impose time limits on the duration of 
suspension without pay. 
Part V explains how these proposed changes alleviate some of the 
existing concerns raised by the current construction of Prop. 50. 
Finally, Part VI will synthesize all points and conclude. 
II.  TRACING PROP. 50’S ORIGINS AND ITS CONFLICT WITH 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
Before the due process defects of Prop. 50 may be identified and 
revisions to the law proposed, Prop. 50’s history must first be 
understood and the concept of procedural due process explained. This 
part follows the origins of Prop. 50 and examines the development of 
case law governing procedural due process. 
A.  Prop. 50 Generally 
Senator Darrell Steinberg introduced Prop. 50 on March 28, 2014, 
as Senate Constitutional Amendment 17.25 The Senate adopted the 
proposition on May 27, 2014, and subsequently referred it to the 
Assembly.26 There, the Assembly enacted Prop. 50. on August 20, 
2014, and it was filed with the Secretary of State’s office on August 
25, 2014.27 Prop. 50 appeared on the June 7, 2016 ballot where it was 
 
 25. See SCA-17 Members of the Legislature: Suspension, CAL. LEGISLATURE INFO., 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SCA17 (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. 
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approved by 77 percent of voters.28 Specifically, Prop. 50 amended 
Article IV, Section 5 of the California Constitution to read: 
Each house may suspend a Member by motion or resolution 
adopted by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of 
the membership concurring. The motion or resolution shall 
contain findings and declarations setting forth the basis for 
the suspension. Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
Constitution, the house may deem the salary and benefits of 
the Member to be forfeited for all or part of the period of the 
suspension by express provision of the motion or 
resolution.29 
1.  It Is No Coincidence That Prop. 50 Was on the Ballot as a 
“Legislatively Referred” Constitutional Amendment and that Senator 
Steinberg Is Its Author 
A majority of statewide voters must ratify any amendment to the 
California Constitution.30 Amendments may come before voters and 
be placed on the ballot in one of two ways:31 1) circulation of an 
initiative petition32 or 2) passage of a proposed amendment by a two-
thirds majority in each house.33 As noted, Prop. 50 was first introduced 
by Senator Steinberg, meaning that Prop. 50 came to voters by way of 
the latter route.  
In theory, the State Senate is led by the Lieutenant Governor, who 
serves as President of the Senate and has the power to cast a vote in 
the event of a tie.34 The California Constitution, however, allows 
members of the Senate to choose their own officers and rules for 
proceedings to run the day-to-day operations of the chamber.35 The 
California Constitution, however, allows members of the Senate to 
choose their own officers and rules for proceedings to run the day-to-
day operations of the chamber.36 Thus, the “President pro Tempore,” 
 
 28. Alison Noon, California Prop. 50 Passes, Allows Lawmakers to Be Suspended Without 
Pay for Wrongdoing, ORANGE CTY. REG. (June 7, 2016, 10:13 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/ 
articles/lawmakers-718601-voters-proposition.html. 
 29. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5. 
 30. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 4. 
 31. 13 CAL. JUR. 3D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6 (3d 2012). 
 32. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. 
 33. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. 
 34. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 9. 
 35. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 7. 
 36. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 7. 
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who also acts as the Chair of the Senate Rules Committee and the 
political leader of the majority party, is the most powerful member of 
the Senate, serving as the presiding officer of that body.37 He or she 
oversees the appointment of committee members, assignment of bills, 
progress of legislation through the chamber, confirmation of 
gubernatorial appointees, and overall direction of policy.38 The “Pro 
Tem” is also responsible for doling out punishment to Senators who 
misbehave.39 Between 2008 and 2014, the Senate Pro Tem was Darrell 
Steinberg, the same Senator who introduced Prop. 50.40  
Why then, might the most powerful member of the Senate 
personally introduce legislation asking Californians to go to the polls 
to ratify his proposal? To Senator Steinberg, the answer is simple: 
because Prop. 50 “closes a technical, but important loophole in the 
law.”41 
2.  Prop. 50 Emerged Because the Legislature Could Not Suspend 
Three “Corrupt” Politicians Without Pay 
Prior to the enactment of Prop. 50, legislators could not be 
suspended without pay. The misconduct of three State Senators made 
this point abundantly clear. 
In 2010, a grand jury indicted Senator Roderick Wright on eight 
felony counts, alleging filing of a false declaration of candidacy, voter 
fraud, and perjury.42 Wright was accused of having listed his residence 
in a district he wished to represent, but actually living elsewhere.43 
 
 37. Leadership, CAL. STATE LEGISLATURE, http://www.legislature.ca.gov/the_state 
_legislature/leadership_and_caucuses/leadership.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. One day after his term expired in 2014, Steinberg became chair of the California 
Government Law and Policy Practice of the law and lobbying firm, Greenberg Traurig LLP. Patrick 
McGreevy, State Sen. Darrell Steinberg to Join Law and Lobbying Firm, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 
2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/ political/la-me-pc-sen-steinberg-to-join-lawlobbying-firm-
20141023-story.html. In June 2016, Steinberg was elected Mayor of Sacramento. See Ryan Lillis, 
Steinberg Wins Sacramento Mayor’s Race by Wide Margin, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 7, 2016, 8:15 
PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/election/local-election/article82416417.ht 
ml. 
 41. Patrick McGreevy, Corruption Scandals Spawn Ballot Measure That Would Let 
Lawmakers Suspend Colleagues Without Pay, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2016), http://www.latimes. 
com/politics/la-pol-sac-anti-corruption-ballot-measure-20160513-story.html. 
 42. Jean Merl, State Sen. Roderick Wright Indicted on Charges of Voter Fraud, Perjury, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2010), https://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-rod-wright-20140913-
story.html. 
 43. Id. 
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Under penalty of perjury, Wright listed his residence on his voter 
registration and declaration of candidacy forms as a multifamily 
complex in Inglewood, within the 25th Senate District, which he was 
elected to represent.44 Evidence depicting full closets, cars, 
prescription medicines, artwork, and other personal effects 
demonstrated that Senator Wright actually lived in a house he owned 
in Baldwin Hills, in the neighboring 26th District, and he was 
convicted by a jury in January 2014.45 
On February 21, 2014, Senator Ron Calderon was charged with 
taking $100,000 in bribes in return for supporting legislation favorable 
to those offering the payments.46 Calderon faced 24 counts of fraud, 
bribery, conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, 
and assisting in the filing of false tax returns.47 The allegations 
stemmed from incidents during which Calderon sponsored legislation 
supportive of 1) a surgery business in return for a hospital owner 
paying Calderon’s son for work he did not complete,48 and 2) a 
supposed independent movie studio (which turned out to be a front by 
undercover FBI investigators) in exchange for the studio head paying 
Calderon’s daughter for work she did not complete.49 Senator 
Calderon later pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of mail fraud on June 
21, 2016.50 
On March 26, 2014, Senator Leland Yee was arrested along with 
Raymond Chow, a gangster known as “Shrimp Boy.”51 Yee was 
charged with conspiracy to commit both wire fraud and arms 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Jean Merl, Wright is Guilty of Voter Fraud, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/29/local/la-me-rod-wright-verdict-20140129. 
 46. Richard Winton, State Sen. Ron Calderon Faces 395 Years for Alleged Bribery Scheme, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.latimes .com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-calderon-faces-395-
years-bribery-case-20140221-story.html. 
 47. Richard Winton, Sen. Ron Calderon Surrenders to Authorities in Corruption Case, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.latimes .com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sen-ron-calderon-turns-
himself-in-20140224-story.html. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Scott Glover & Hector Becerra, California Sen. Ronald S. Calderon, Brother Charged in 
FBI Probe, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-0222-calderon-
20140222-story.html. 
 50. Matt Hamilton, Former State Sen. Ron Calderon Pleads Guilty in Federal Corruption 
Case, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2016), http:// www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ron-calderon-
guilty-plea-20160621-snap-story.html. 
 51. Maura Dolan, Scott Gold & Joe Mozingo, State Sen. Leland Yee Arrested on Corruption 
Charges in FBI Sting, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:22 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-
yee-arrest-20140327-story.html. 
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trafficking.52 In exchange for campaign contributions, Senator Yee 
had allegedly agreed to use his influence to set up meetings for 
undercover agents posing as businessmen interested in medical 
marijuana and firearms.53 On July 1, 2015, Yee plead guilty to a 
reduced racketeering charge.54 
The Senate agreed near unanimously that Senators Wright, 
Calderon, and Yee needed to be reprimanded, but members differed 
as to how.55 Some demanded that the Senators resign or face 
expulsion; others favored suspension until the criminal charges were 
resolved.56 
On February 25, 2014, the Office of Legislative Counsel sent 
Senator Steinberg an opinion letter confirming that while the Senate 
may suspend its members and prevent them from exercising the 
privileges of their office, “the body does not have the power to suspend 
its Members without pay.”57 Accordingly, on March 28, 2014, the 
same day that Prop. 50 was introduced,58 the Senate voted 28-1 to 
suspend Senators Wright, Calderon, and Yee with pay.59 The 
suspensions were to remain in effect “until all criminal proceedings 
currently pending against them have been dismissed.”60 Senator 
Wright resigned on September 22, 2014.61 Senators Calderon and Yee 
 
 52. Times Staff Writers, Sen. Yee Charged with Trafficking Firearms in Sweeping FBI Probe, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-yee-charged-
trafficking-firearms-fbi-20140326-story.html. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Lee Romney, et al., Ex-state Sen. Leland Yee Pleads Guilty to Racketeering in Corruption 
Case, L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2015, 9:11 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ff-
leland-yee-plea-20150701-story.html. 
 55. Patrick McGreevy, In Unprecedented Move, State Senate Votes to Suspend Three 
Lawmakers, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014, 4:28 PM), http:// www.latimes.com/local/la-me-yee-
capitol-20140329-story.html. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Steinberg, Bill Analysis, SENATE RULES COMM., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-
14/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sca_17_cfa_20140523_141151_sen_comm.html (last visited Apr. 4, 
2019) (entry for “05/23/14- Senate Floor Analyses”). 
 58. The Times Editorial Board, Should Accused California Legislators Still be Paid?, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/apr/01/opinion/la-ed-suspensions-with-pay-
yee-calderon-wright-20140401. 
 59. McGreevy, supra note 55. 
 60. SR 38 Senate Resolution, BILL ANALYSIS, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1314/bill/sen 
/sb_00010050/sr_38_cfa_20141008_094748_sen_floor.html. 
 61. Patrick McGreevy & Jean Merl, Sen. Wright to Resign Sept. 22, Start Sentence Oct. 31, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-rod-wright-
20140916-story.html. 
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served their suspensions, and left office after their terms expired in 
November 2014.62 
3.  The Legislative Counsel Opinion 
The constitutional rationale for the Senate’s previous inability to 
suspend members without pay is detailed in a February 25, 2014 
opinion letter by the Office of Legislative Counsel.63 First, the opinion 
letter relies upon the enactment of Proposition 112 in 1990, which 
amended Article III, Section 8 of the California Constitution to create 
the California Citizens Compensation Commission.64 The opinion 
letter states that “the Constitution vests the Commission with the 
power to adjust the salary and benefits of Members of the 
Legislature.”65 Second, the opinion also states that, under the 
California Constitution, “the salaries of elected state officers may not 
be reduced during their term of office.”66 Finally, the opinion letter 
warns that suspension without pay could lead to judicial review and 
reversal by court order67 as in the New Jersey case, Vas v. Roberts.68  
There, Joseph Vas, a former member of the New Jersey General 
Assembly, sought judicial review of a decision by the former 
Assembly Speaker, Joseph Roberts, to suspend Vas without pay.69 
Following an investigation spanning two years, a state grand jury 
indicted Vas on eleven counts related to “conspiracy, misconduct, 
pattern of official misconduct, theft, misapplication of government 
 
 62. Patrick McGreevy & Phil Willon, Judge Rules Office Records of Ex-Sens. Calderon and 
Yee Must Be Disclosed, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-
pc-records-calderon-yee-20150604-story.html. 
 63. The Office of Legislative Counsel “is a nonpartisan public agency that drafts legislative 
proposals, prepares legal opinions, and provides other confidential legal services to the Legislature 
and others.” Welcome to the Website of Legislative Counsel of California, ST. OF CAL. OFF. OF 
LEG. COUNS., http://legislativecounsel.ca.gov (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). Attempts to secure the 
opinion letter in its entirety have been unsuccessful as the Office stated that the letter was protected 
by attorney-client privilege. The author made a request under the CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RECORDS 
ACT on September 27, 2016. On October 12, 2016, the Office denied the request, claiming in 
writing that the opinion was exempt on the basis of attorney client privilege and/or as a record of 
the Office of Legislative Counsel. Further efforts to procure the opinion letter were unsuccessful. 
 64. STATE OFFICIALS, ETHICS, SALARIES. OPEN MEETINGS. LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT, Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 112 (1990). 
 65. SR 38 Senate Resolution, supra note 60. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Kyle Buis, California Senators Hold On to Pay Because of New Jersey Court Decision, 
CBS SACRAMENTO (Mar. 28, 2014, 7:57 PM), http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2014/03/28/web-
exclusive-california-senators-hold-on-to-pay-because-of-new-jersey-court-decision/. 
 68. 14 A.3d 766 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). 
 69. Id.  
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property, and tampering with public records.”70 Subsequent state and 
federal grand juries returned additional indictments against Vas.71 
The New Jersey Constitution specified that legislators “shall 
receive annually, during the term for which they shall have been 
elected and while they shall hold their office, such compensation as 
shall . . . be fixed by law[.]”72 Thus, the court held that members had 
a constitutionally protected interest in receiving their salary while in 
office and that Roberts, therefore, lacked the authority to suspend Vas 
without pay.73 
It is clear, then, that Prop. 50 was introduced to give Senator 
Steinberg (and his successors) a power which he previously lacked. 
Indeed, Prop. 50 was intended to serve as a legislative work-around to 
the Citizens Compensation Commission dilemma and the 
constitutional guarantee that reductions in state officers’ salaries 
cannot take effect during their terms in office, while precluding the 
possibility of judicial review, as illuminated in the Vas case. Now that 
Prop. 50’s origins have been explored, the concept of procedural due 
process may be explained, and its inherent conflict with Prop. 50 
detailed. 
B.  Procedural Due Process Generally 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution ensures that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”74 The 
Fourteenth Amendment extends these protections to actions by the 
individual states, guaranteeing that no state may “deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”75 But what 
does “due process of law” require? And what constitutes “property” 
sufficient to trigger these due process protections? 
1.  Due Process Requires Notice and the Opportunity to be Heard 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,76 the Supreme 
Court articulated that prior to a State’s deprivation of a life, liberty, or 
 
 70. Id. at 769. 
 71. Id. 
 72. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 4, ¶ 7. 
 73. Vas, 14 A.3d at 778. 
 74. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
 76. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
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property interest, procedural due process requires both notice and the 
opportunity to be heard.77 The Court noted that an “elementary and 
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to 
be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”78 
The United States Supreme Court remained largely silent on the 
notice and hearing requirements for the next twenty years.79 Then, in 
1970, the Court reached its seminal decision in Goldberg v. Kelly.80 
In Goldberg, residents receiving state and federal financial aid 
entitlements sought judicial review of the termination of these 
benefits.81 Noting that the benefits at issue provided recipients “the 
means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care,” 
the Court concluded that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing 
would satisfy the notice and hearing requirements of procedural due 
process.82 Expanding on the hearing requirement, the Court was quick 
to caution that, while a pre-termination hearing need not take the form 
of a trial, due process “require[s] that a recipient have timely and 
adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and 
an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse 
witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence 
orally.”83 
2.  Property Under the Due Process Clauses 
In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,84 the Supreme 
Court recognized that “the property interests protected by procedural 
due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, 
chattels, or money.”85 The Court noted that: 
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must 
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have 
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, 
 
 77. Id. at 313. 
 78. Id. at 314. 
 79. Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
 80. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 81. Id. at 255–56. 
 82. Id. at 264. 
 83. Id. at 266–68. 
 84. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
 85. Id. at 571–72. 
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have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it . . . . Property 
interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. 
Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law—rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support 
claims of entitlement to those benefits.86 
The Supreme Court again addressed property rights in the context of 
employment in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.87 Under 
state law, Loudermill could only be fired “for cause” and was entitled 
to an administrative review of his termination.88 He brought suit, 
contending that he had a property interest in his employment and that 
the procedures in place for administrative review were deficient under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.89 The Court agreed, finding that a 
guarantee that Loudermill could only be terminated “for cause,” rather 
than at will, created a property interest in employment sufficient to 
trigger the notice and hearing requirements of procedural due 
process.90  
3.  The Mathews Test 
In Mathews v. Eldridge,91 the Supreme Court announced three 
factors for consideration in determining whether specific procedures 
comport with due process’ notice and hearing requirements: 
First, the private interest . . . affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 
the Government’s interest, including the function involved 
 
 86. Id. at 577. 
 87. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
 88. Id. at 535. 
 89. Id. at 536. 
 90. Id. at 532. The Court further expanded on the hearing requirement, noting that the purpose 
of the pre-deprivation hearing is to “be an initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially, a 
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the 
employee are true and support the proposed action.” Id. at 545–46. It doled out the requirements of 
such a hearing, concluding that “[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice 
of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present 
his side of the story.” Id. at 546. 
 91. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.92 
Eldridge, an individual receiving disability benefits under the Social 
Security Act, sought judicial review of the procedures in place to 
challenge termination of those benefits.93 In applying these three 
factors, the Court concluded that the procedures in place “fully 
comport with due process.”94 
4.  Notice and Hearing Requirements Post Gilbert 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Goldberg suggests 
that the state instrumentality must provide a hearing prior to the 
deprivation of an individual’s property interest. That changed for 
public employees when the Court heard Gilbert v. Homar95 in 1997.96 
In that case, Homar served as a police officer employed at a 
Pennsylvania public university and was arrested during a drug raid.97 
He was charged with a count of marijuana possession, possession with 
intent to deliver, and conspiracy to violate the controlled substance 
law.98 The university’s police chief immediately suspended Homar 
without pay.99 Homar brought suit, alleging that the university’s 
failure to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior 
to being suspended without pay violated due process.100  
In noting that the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing is to 
determine whether there are reasonable grounds to support the 
suspension without pay, the Court concluded that “a grand jury 
indictment provides adequate assurance that the suspension is not 
unjustified.”101 The Court found that an individual being arrested and 
formally charged with a felony is similarly sufficient because an 
independent third party, such as a prosecutor, “has determined that 
there is probable cause to believe the employee committed a serious 
crime.”102 The Court concluded that “the State has a significant 
 
 92. Id. at 335. 
 93. Id. at 323–25. 
 94. See Id. at 349. 
 95. 520 U.S. 924 (1997). 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 926. 
 98. Id. at 926–27. 
 99. Id. at 927. The conspiracy charge was classified as a felony. Id.  
 100. Id. at 928. 
 101. Id. at 934. 
 102. Id. 
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interest in immediately suspending, when felony charges are filed 
against them, employees who occupy positions of great public trust 
and high public visibility, such as police officers.”103 It is apparent 
then, that in limited circumstances, public employees may be 
suspended without pay, without a presuspension hearing, so long as a 
prompt postsuspension hearing is held. That is because “the 
government does not have to give an employee charged with a felony 
a paid leave at taxpayer expense.”104 
III.  PROP. 50 DOES NOT PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER AS WRITTEN 
In light of the foregoing discussion, this Section posits that Prop. 
50 is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, Prop. 50 provides 
procedures which fail to comport with the notice requirements 
consistently articulated by the United States Supreme Court. Second, 
Prop. 50 provides insufficient hearing procedures to legislators 
contesting their suspension without pay. 
A.  A Legislator’s Pay is “Property” Within the Meaning of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Writing for the Roth majority, Justice Stewart noted that the 
“requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation 
of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection 
of liberty and property.”105 Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have 
reiterated that “no process is due if one is not deprived of life, liberty, 
or property[.]”106 Thus, in order for some sort of notice and hearing to 
be due, the threshold inquiry is whether suspension of a legislator’s 
pay implicates a life, liberty, or property interest.107 
Typically, property interests are “not created by the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by an 
independent source such as state statutes[.]”108 State law, then, 
illuminates whether a property interest exists. At least one provision 
 
 103. Id. at 932. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 106. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132 (2015) (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke, 565 U.S. 216, 
219 (2011)) (internal citations omitted). 
 107. Colorable arguments could be made that Prop. 50 implicates either a life and/or liberty 
interest. This Article focuses, however, on the treatment of legislator pay as a property interest. 
 108. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of the California Constitution creates a protected property interest in 
pay for state legislators. 
1.  Article III, Section 4 of the California Constitution  
Mandates that The Salaries of State Legislators  
May Not Be Reduced During Their Term of Office 
State law creates a protected property interest in a benefit where 
an individual has a reasonable expectation of entitlement to that 
benefit.109 Whether a reasonable expectation of entitlement exists is 
“determined largely by the language of the statute and the extent to 
which the entitlement is couched in mandatory terms.”110 
Article III, Section 4 of the California Constitution mandates that 
“salaries of elected state officers may not be reduced during their term 
of office.”111 State officers include state legislators.112 On its face, the 
provision gives no discretion to decision makers to reduce state 
legislators’ salaries mid-term. The provision’s plain language and 
comparison to case precedent, then, makes clear that legislators have 
a property interest in receiving uninterrupted, non-reducible pay. 
In Roth, a nontenured college professor at Wisconsin State 
University-Oskosh hired for a one-year term, challenged his dismissal 
after being notified that he would not be rehired for the subsequent 
academic year.113 Under Wisconsin law, a nontenured teacher must be 
informed by February 1 whether or not he is to be retained for the 
following year, but “no reason for non-retention need be given. No 
 
 109. Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 110. Id. 
 111. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 4(a) (emphasis added). Subdivision(b) provides one exception to 
this guarantee for “a judge of a court of record.” This subsection applies only to judges and not to 
other state officers. See David Villalba, Authority of the California Citizens Compensation 
Commission to Reduce Elected Officials’ Salaries During Their Term in Office, DEP’T OF PERS. 
ADMIN. (June 11, 2009), http://www.calhr.ca.gov/Documents/cccc-mid-term-salaray-reductions-
20090611.pdf (holding that “Subdivision(b) applies only to judges, not other elected officials”). 
 112. State officers include “the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Controller, 
Insurance Commissioner, Secretary of State, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Treasurer, 
member of the State Board of Equalization, and Member of the Legislature.” CAL. CONST. art. III, 
§ 8(l) (emphasis added); see also Jake M. Hurley, Mid-Term Salary Reductions of Elected State 
Officers, DEP’T OF PERS. ADMIN. (May 18, 2009), http://www.calhr.ca.gov/Documents/cccc-
reduce-during-term-dpa-20090518.pdf. (“While the term ‘elected state officers’ is not defined for 
purposes of [Article III,] section 4(a), the California Supreme Court has held this term to include 
elected state officers in all three branches of government.”) (referencing Olson v. Cory, 27 Cal. 3d 
532, 543 (1980)). 
 113. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566 (1972). 
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review or appeal is provided in such case.”114 State law “leaves the 
decision whether to rehire a nontenured teacher for another year to the 
unfettered discretion of university officials.”115 
Roth argued that he had a “property” interest in continued 
employment and that his not being rehired and not having been told 
why violated his due process rights.116 The Supreme Court disagreed 
because the express terms of Roth’s employment stated that he would 
be employed for a one-year term, and university officials had 
discretion on whether to rehire Roth.117 Therefore, Roth lacked a 
property interest in continued employment beyond the one year term 
and was not entitled to the notice and hearing requirements of 
procedural due process.118 
Roth is inapposite precisely due to the level of discretion vested 
in superiors in deciding whether to rehire nontenured professors after 
their initial one year term. Whereas in Roth the statute left university 
officials free to choose whether or not to retain nontenured professors, 
Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous that state legislators’ salaries 
may not be reduced during their terms in office.119 
The Supreme Court’s finding of a property interest in Loudermill 
further supports a determination that state legislators possess a 
protected property interest in their pay.120 There, the Cleveland Board 
of Education had hired Loudermill as a security guard after Loudermill 
indicated on his job application that he had never been convicted of a 
felony.121 After learning that Loudermill had previously been 
convicted of grand larceny, the Board dismissed Loudermill without 
giving him a chance to respond or otherwise challenge the firing.122  
Loudermill pursued judicial review of the Board’s termination, 
charging that he had a property right in his employment and was due 
some sort of hearing.123 The Court agreed, relying on the statutory 
language which guaranteed that Loudermill was entitled to retain his 
position “during good behavior and efficient service, . . . [and] could 
 
 114. Id. at 567 (internal citation omitted). 
 115. Id. (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. at 568. 
 117. Id. at 578. 
 118. Id. 
 119. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 4(a). 
 120. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 532 (1985). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 536. 
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not be dismissed except . . . for . . . misfeasance, malfeasance, or 
nonfeasance in office.”124  
Importantly, the Loudermill Court was willing to find that 
Loudermill possessed a property right in continued employment even 
where the statute provided superiors with limited discretion to 
terminate employees in certain instances involving impropriety or 
poor performance.125 Article III, Section 4’s plain language gives no 
such discretion to decision makers to reduce legislators’ salaries 
during their terms of office. It is instead absolute, compelling a finding 
that Article III, Section 4 confers to legislators a protected property 
interest in their salary.126 
2.  Prop. 50’s “Notwithstanding” Language Does Not Destroy 
Legislators’ Property Interest in Pay 
Prop. 50 includes the specific language that the Legislature’s 
ability to suspend a member without pay upon a two-thirds vote is 
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution[.]”127 
Thus, it would appear upon first glance that there is a conflict in the 
California Constitution between Article IV, Section 5 (which codified 
Prop. 50 into law) and Article III, Section 4 (which prohibits the 
reduction of a legislator’s salary during the legislator’s current term), 
extinguishing a legislator’s protected property interest in receiving 
uninterrupted, non-reducible pay. However, such a reading would 
ignore the United States Supreme Court’s repudiation of the “bitter 
with the sweet” principle. 
In the context of procedural due process, the “bitter with the 
sweet” approach maintains that “when the source of a property right 
contains within it specified procedures for protection of that right, one 
cannot simultaneously insist upon the right and complain that the 
 
 124. Id. at 538–39 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125. Id. at 539 n 4. 
 126. Courts in other jurisdictions have found that public employees have protected property 
rights to their compensation. See Sherlock v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 161, 165 (1908) (holding 
that the federal Postmaster-General could fix an employee’s salary, “but when fixed, as long as he 
was an incumbent of the office, so far as earned, it was his property . . . [and] no power could take 
[it] from him without due process of law.”); Hanchey v. State ex rel. Roberts, 52 So. 2d 429, 431–
32 (Fla. 1951) (holding that a Florida Sheriff is entitled to a commission based on moneys collected 
for the State because an officer “is now responsible to the public for the performance of the duties 
of the office, and, upon assuming the duties and responsibilities thereof likewise he became entitled 
to its profits and emoluments. The right of compensation is an incident to the office as the person 
holding the office is entitled to its compensation.”). 
 127. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(2)(A). 
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specified procedures are constitutionally inadequate.”128 The principle 
is commonly associated with the case of Arnett v. Kennedy.129 
In Arnett, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Lloyd-La 
Follette Act’s procedures for removing a nonprobationary employee 
from the Federal Civil Service violated that employee’s procedural 
due process rights.130 There, the Act stated that an employee could not 
be terminated except for “such cause as will promote the efficiency of 
the service.”131 The statute “expressly provided also for the procedure 
by which ‘cause’ was to be determined[.]”132 In writing for a plurality 
of the Court, Justice Rehnquist noted that “where the grant of a 
substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the 
procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a 
litigant . . . must take the bitter with the sweet.”133 
According to the Court’s plurality opinion, because the employee 
relied on the Lloyd-La Follette Act’s “for cause” language as the basis 
for his claim that he had a protected property interest in continued 
employment, the employee must accept the Act’s procedural 
limitations.134 By this “bitter with the sweet” logic, if a legislator were 
to rely on California Constitution Article III, Section 4’s guarantee 
that salary may not be reduced during the legislator’s current term in 
office, the legislator must also accept California Constitution Article 
IV, Section 5’s procedural limitation that upon a “motion or resolution 
adopted by . . . two-thirds of the membership concurring[,] . . . the 
house may deem the salary and benefits of the Member to be forfeited 
[.]”135 However, the Supreme Court later rejected this “bitter with the 
sweet” approach by an 8-1 margin.136 
In Loudermill, seven Justices concurred with Justice White that 
“the ‘bitter with the sweet’ approach misconceives the constitutional 
guarantee” of procedural due process.137 Justice White clarified that 
 
 128. Jeffrey M. Gamso, Tenured Public Employee Entitled to Pre-Termination Hearing 
Regardless of Statutory Procedures for Dismissal: Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 
105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985), 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 255, 262 (1986). 
 129. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 151–52. 
 132. Id. at 152. 
 133. Id. at 153–54. 
 134. Id. 
 135. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 136. See Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193, 196 
(1990). 
 137. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
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“[t]he categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule 
otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. 
‘Property’ cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its 
deprivation[.]”138 That the statute which stated that the Board could 
only terminate Loudermill “for cause” also specified its own 
procedures to govern termination in no way defined or eliminated 
Loudermill’s property interest in continued employment.139 Similarly, 
although Article IV, Section 5 states that either house of the 
Legislature may suspend a legislator without pay with: 1) a two-thirds 
vote and 2) a declaration explaining the basis for the suspension,140 
such a procedural limitation does not define or eliminate the property 
right conferred by Article III, Section 4’s guarantee that “salaries of 
elected state officers may not be reduced during their term of 
office.”141 
Accordingly, Article IV, Section 5 attempts to answer the 
question of “what process is due” rather than “whether process is 
due[.]”142 Article III, Section 4 already answers the latter inquiry in 
the affirmative. This distinction is not one without a difference. 
Once state law confers a protected property interest, “the question 
remains what process is due.”143 The answer does not lie in state law, 
such as Article IV, Section 5, because “minimum procedural 
requirements are a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by 
the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it 
may deem adequate[.]”144 Federal law, therefore, dictates “what 
process is due” to a legislator choosing to challenge a suspension 
without pay. 
B.  Prop. 50 Provides Insufficient Notice and Hearing Procedures 
At its core, procedural due process requires notice and the 
opportunity to be heard.145 Prop. 50 provides neither of these 
safeguards enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Id. at 539–40. 
 140. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a)(2)(A). 
 141. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 4(a). 
 142. See Farina, supra note 136, at 195. 
 143. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
 144. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541. 
 145. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
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1.  The Plain Language of Article IV, Section 5 Makes  
No Mention of the Notice Provided to a Legislator Facing 
Suspension Without Pay 
In Mullane, the Supreme Court articulated what sort of notice is 
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. There, the Central 
Hanover Bank established a common trust fund and subsequently 
petitioned a New York Court for the settlement of the account after 
placing a notice in a local newspaper.146 The publication stated the 
name and address of the Central Hanover Bank, the name of the 
common trust fund and the date it was established, and a list of all 
funds, trusts, and/or estates participating in the trust fund, as required 
under New York law.147 
Mullane, the court-appointed special guardian, objected, 
contending that the statute’s procedures were insufficient under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.148 The Court 
agreed, finding that the Bank was required to send mail notice to 
individuals whose names and addresses the Bank knew.149 This 
relative lack of notice was crucial to the Court’s reasoning because the 
“right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that 
the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or 
default, acquiesce or contest.”150 
Prop. 50 merely provides, in relevant part, that “[e]ach house may 
suspend a Member by motion or resolution adopted by rollcall vote 
entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring. The 
motion or resolution shall contain findings and declarations setting 
forth the basis for the suspension.”151 The measure lacks any express 
language requiring that prior to the consideration of any suspension 
motion or resolution, legislators give the member notification of the 
pending motion and/or the time and place that such a motion or 
resolution is to be considered.152 This directly contravenes the Court’s 
clear directive in Mullane that “the notice must be of such nature as 
 
 146. Id. at 309. 
 147. Id. at 309–10. 
 148. Id. at 311. 
 149. Id. at 318. 
 150. Id. at 314. 
 151. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(2)(A). 
 152. While Prop. 50 requires that there be a written explanation for the suspension without pay, 
it is unclear when, if at all, the Legislature provides this explanation to an aggrieved legislator. 
Presumably, this explanation might be provided to a legislator after a motion or resolution to 
suspend without pay has already been passed. 
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reasonably [necessary] to convey the required information . . . and it 
must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their 
appearance[.]”153 
2.  The Plain Language of Article IV, Section 5  
Makes No Mention of the Hearing Provided 
 to a Legislator Facing Suspension Without Pay 
Any determination of whether Prop. 50 is constitutionally 
sufficient begins with the recognition that the “fundamental requisite 
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”154 The Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Goldberg provides the basic framework for what is 
required during such an opportunity.155  
In Goldberg, New York City residents receiving state and federal 
financial aid entitlements challenged the sufficiency of procedures in 
place governing the termination of these entitlements.156 The 
procedures required that recipients be given notice of the proposed 
termination at least seven days in advance, have the ability to 
challenge the termination to a superior official, and enjoy the 
opportunity to submit a written statement detailing why the proposed 
termination should not take effect.157 While the recipients were not 
able to appear in person, present evidence orally, or confront adverse-
witnesses prior to a determination decision, recipients could request a 
post-termination “fair hearing” where such recourse was available.158  
The Court concluded that “when welfare is discontinued, only a 
pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with 
procedural due process.”159 Therefore, that an in-person hearing was 
available only after an eligibility decision had been made proved “fatal 
to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures.”160 The Court 
acknowledged that the “hearing need not take the form of a judicial or 
quasi-judicial trial.”161 However, “where credibility and veracity are 
at issue, . . . written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for 
 
 153. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
 154. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). 
 155. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255–56 (1970). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 258. 
 158. Id. at 259. 
 159. Id. at 264. 
 160. Id. at 268. 
 161. Id. at 266. 
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decision. . . . [A] recipient must be allowed to state his position 
orally.”162 
With respect to a hearing, Prop. 50 states only that “[e]ach house 
may suspend a Member by motion or resolution adopted by rollcall 
vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership 
concurring.”163 Whereas the statute in Goldberg was inadequate even 
where it specified that an aggrieved individual could appear 
personally, present evidence orally, and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses (after an eligibility determination had been made), the 
express language of Prop. 50 is silent as to any of these basic 
protections. Notably, Cal. Gov’t Code § 8940 et seq., which governs 
the Joint Legislative Ethics Committee,164 by statute specifically 
grants accused members various rights during hearings to “examine 
and make copies of all evidence in the possession of the 
committee[,]”165 to “be represented by legal counsel; to call and 
examine witnesses; to introduce exhibits; and to cross-examine 
opposing witnesses[,]”166 and to “testify or, at the discretion of the 
committee, to file a statement of facts under oath relating solely to the 
material relevant to the testimony of which he complains.”167 Thus, in 
other areas of state law, where a member of the Legislature has been 
accused of wrongdoing, the Legislature has been careful to clearly 
articulate the nature of a disciplinary hearing and to notify the accused 
member of his or her rights during such a hearing. The drafters of Prop. 
50 could have provided legislators facing suspension any of these 
rights or those articulated by the Goldberg court; the fact that they did 
not suggests a deliberate choice not to. 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The idea behind Prop. 50 is simple: “Why should lawmakers get 
a paid vacation if they’re accused of violating the public trust?”168 At 
the time it was enacted, many members of the Legislature and the 
 
 162. Id. at 269. 
 163. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a)(2)(A). 
 164. The Joint Legislative Ethics Committee investigates and makes “findings and 
recommendations concerning alleged [ethics] violations by Members of the Legislature[.]” CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 8943(a). 
 165. Id. § 8946. 
 166. Id.§ 8948(b). 
 167. Id.§ 8949. 
 168. The Times Editorial Board, supra note 22. 
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public alike hailed Prop. 50 as an important tool that would allow 
lawmakers to hold their colleagues accountable.169 But the road to Hell 
is paved with good intentions. If Prop. 50’s drafters were serious about 
enacting a good-government reform that would curb corruption, then 
the measure is in serious need of a linguistic detour to survive a 
constitutional challenge. Indeed, several key changes are necessary for 
Prop. 50 to withstand judicial scrutiny. 
A.  Requirement of Written Notice 
In its present form, Prop. 50 merely requires that a motion or 
resolution to suspend a legislator without pay contain “findings and 
declarations” regarding the basis for any suspension.170 The measure 
is otherwise silent as to the specific mechanism required to notify 
accused legislators of pending suspension proceedings. To the 
contrary, Section 8944 of the California Government Code, which 
governs the filing of complaints against legislators with the Joint 
Legislative Ethics Committee, requires that any complaint: 1) be in 
writing; 2) state the name of the legislator accused of having 
committed a violation; 3) set forth allegations, which if true, would 
constitute an ethics violation with the Committee’s jurisdiction; 4) be 
signed by the complainant under penalty of perjury; 5) include a 
statement that the complainant knows the facts alleged to be true or 
believes them to be true; and 6) be sent promptly to the accused 
legislator by the Committee.171 Incorporation of these precise 
requirements into Article IV, Section 5 would mitigate Prop. 50’s 
notice shortcomings. 
B.  Guarantee of Hearing 
Prop. 50 is similarly vague as to the sort of hearing (if any) 
provided to a legislator facing suspension without pay. Article IV, 
Section 5 merely offers that “Each house may suspend a Member by 
motion or resolution adopted by rollcall vote entered in the journal, 
two-thirds of the membership concurring.”172 Presumably, a house of 
the Legislature considers a motion or resolution to suspend a legislator 
without pay in the same manner it would any other piece of 
 
 169. See McGreevy, supra note 41. 
 170. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(2)(A). 
 171. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8944(b), (d). 
 172. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(2)(A). 
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legislation.173 However, a resolution to proclaim the 30th anniversary 
of the Paris Wine Tasting of 1976174 necessarily does not implicate the 
same magnitude of concerns as a resolution to suspend a legislator 
without pay. Common sense suggests, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution requires, that more stringent hearing 
procedures accompany any possible suspension without pay. 
1.  Particular Procedures 
In his article “Some Kind of Hearing,” famed Second Circuit 
Judge Henry J. Friendly suggests that any fair hearing requires175 1) 
an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not 
be taken; 2) the right to call witnesses; 3) the right to know the 
evidence against oneself; 4) the right to counsel; and 5) and public 
attendance.176 Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8940–48, which governs the Joint 
Legislative Ethics Committee’s operating procedures, guarantees: 1) 
the right to present exhibits; 2) the right to call, examine, and cross-
examine witnesses; 3) that an accused legislator may examine and 
make copies of all evidence in the possession of the committee relating 
to the initial complaint; 4) representation by legal counsel; and 5) that 
any hearing be open to the public.177 Any subsequent amendment to 
Prop. 50 should heed Judge Friendly’s suggestions and draw upon the 
analogous procedures found under Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8940–48. 
2.  Timing of the Hearing 
Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a legislator 
facing an unpaid suspension receive a hearing before or after a 
decision to suspend is made depends on the proposed basis for the 
suspension. That is because “the State has a significant interest in 
immediately suspending, when felony charges are filed against them, 
 
 173. Procedure is governed by the State Constitution, Joint Rules, Senate Standing Rules, 
Assembly Standing Rules, and/or Mason’s Manual. See Glossary of Legislative Terms, CAL. ST. 
LEGISLATURE, http://www.legislature.ca.gov/quicklinks/glossary.html. 
 174. Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 153, CAL. LEGISLATIVE INFO., http://leginfo. 
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200520060ACR153. 
 175. Judge Friendly makes other recommendations unrelated to the hearing requirement and 
instead related to preservation of the right to seek judicial review, the notice requirement, and other 
areas not covered in this section. Those suggestions are not included here. 
 176. Friendly, supra note 79. 
 177. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8946. 
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employees who occupy positions of great public trust and high public 
visibility[.]”178 
The timing of a hearing accompanying a legislator’s unpaid 
suspension must therefore hinge on whether the legislator is accused 
of having committed a felony or some lesser criminal offense.179 
Legislators accused of either a misdemeanor or an infraction must be 
entitled to a pre-suspension hearing. Legislators accused of having 
committed a felony, however, may be suspended without pay without 
first having a hearing so long as they are accorded a post-suspension 
hearing. 
C.  Imposition of a Time Limit on Duration of the Suspension 
Article IV, Section 5 of the California Constitution states that the  
suspension of a Member pursuant to this paragraph shall 
remain in effect until the date specified in the motion or 
resolution or, if no date is specified, the date a subsequent 
motion or resolution terminating the suspension is adopted 
by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the 
membership of the house concurring.180  
Hence, there is no requirement that a suspension last a finite period of 
time and legislators could conceivably be suspended without pay for 
significant portions of their terms, including the remaining durations 
of their terms. Indeed, Senators Yee and Calderon were suspended for 
eight months through the end of their terms.181 
The term of office for a state Senator is four years while Assembly 
members serve two years.182 Consequently, a suspension under Prop. 
50 should not exceed six months, one-quarter of an Assembly term or 
one-eighth of a Senate term. If the circumstances warrant it, the 
relevant chamber could choose to renew the suspension at the end of 
the initial six-month span. Of course, if the crime is so grave and the 
 
 178. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997). 
 179. A “felony is a crime punishable by death, by imprisonment in state prison, or by 
imprisonment in county jail under P.C. 1170(h). Every other crime or public offense is a 
misdemeanor ‘except those offenses that are classified as infractions.’ (P.C. 17(a).)”. NORMAN L. 
EPSTEIN ET AL., WITKIN CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 86 (4th. ed. 2012). 
 180. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5. 
 181. McGreevy, supra note 41. 
 182. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 9001. 
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legislator is already adjudged guilty in a court of law, the Legislature 
would be free to exercise its impeachment powers.183 
D.  Limitation on the Applicability of the Proposition 
In its present form, Prop. 50 lacks language limiting the 
circumstances in which it may be invoked. Given that Prop. 50 was 
born out of the aftermath of the Legislature’s inability to suspend 
without pay members accused of criminal activity, it is appropriate 
that Prop. 50’s own language expressly limit its use to the criminal 
impropriety context. Adding language to Article IV, Section 5 such as 
“suspension of a Member pursuant to this paragraph may occur only 
where that Member has been charged and/or convicted of a criminal 
offense under federal, state, local, or other applicable law” is crucial 
to ensuring that the provision comports with its original intent. 
V.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PROPOSAL 
Amending Article IV, Section 5 of the California Constitution 
would serve two fundamental purposes. First, inclusion of the 
proposed additions would mitigate constitutional concerns implicated 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, it would further various 
policy goals. 
A.  Constitutional Concerns Mitigated 
Assuming the finding of a constitutionally protected property 
interest, courts must then determine “what process is due.”184 Over the 
last four decades, “the cornerstone for all analysis of procedural 
adequacy has become Justice Powell’s opinion in Mathews v. 
Eldridge.”185 Thus, whether the changes proposed to Prop. 50 in this 
Article mitigate the constitutional concerns with the measure in its 
current form depends upon consideration of three factors: 
 
 183. Senator Joel Anderson was the sole senator to vote “nea” on the suspensions of Senators 
Calderon, Wright, and Yee in 2014. With respect to Prop. 50, Anderson has said “those people 
shouldn’t be suspended; they should be expelled. If you cannot perform the duty of voting for a bill 
– for whatever reason – then you need to go home.” Ben Adler, Proposition 50: Should Legislature 
Be Able To Suspend Lawmakers Without Pay?, CAP. PUB. RADIO (May 23, 2016), http://www. 
capradio.org/articles/2016/05/23/proposition-50-should-legislature-be-able-to-suspend-
lawmakers-without-pay/. 
 184. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
 185. CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JUDICIAL REVIEW § 8129 
(1st ed. 2006). 
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.186 
1.  Loss of a Legislator’s Salary is a Significant 
Private Interest at Stake 
The Supreme Court has “repeatedly recognized the severity of 
depriving someone of his or her livelihood[.]”187 Yet, the Gilbert 
Court upheld the unpaid suspension of a police officer facing various 
felony drug charges.188 There, Homar argued he had a significant 
private interest at stake in “the uninterrupted receipt of his 
paycheck.”189 The Court disagreed, reasoning that because Homar 
faced only a temporary suspension without pay and was given a post-
suspension hearing, his lost income was relatively insubstantial and 
benefits such as health and life insurance were likely not affected.190 
However, unlike Homar who faced just the loss of his salary, a 
legislator suspended under Prop. 50 faces the loss of both his salary 
and benefits.191 Therefore, a suspension pursuant to Prop. 50 
implicates higher stakes than an unpaid suspension like the one in 
Gilbert because a legislator may also face the loss of health, dental, 
vision, and other benefits.192 
Similarly, in Mathews, the Supreme Court upheld the 
administrative procedures in place for contesting a decision to 
terminate social security disability benefits.193 The Court determined 
 
 186. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 187. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 243 (1988). 
 188. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 924 (1997). 
 189. Id. at 932. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a)(2)(A) (after a house has passed a suspension by two-thirds 
vote, “the house may deem the salary and benefits of the Member to be forfeited”) (emphasis 
added). 
 192. See Proposition 50 SCA 17 (Resolution Chapter 127, Statutes of 2014), Steinberg. 
Members of the Legislature: suspension, LCA (June 7, 2016), https://lao.ca.gov/BallotAnalysis 
/Proposition?number=50&year=2016.   
 193. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 319 (1976). 
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that Eldridge’s only private interest at stake was the uninterrupted 
receipt of disability benefits pending an administrative determination 
of his eligibility.194 In reaching its decision, the Court distinguished 
between eligibility for disability benefits and matters of “financial 
need”, such as welfare benefits.195 Whereas welfare recipients rely on 
entitlements as subsistence, the Court contended that individuals like 
Eldridge might receive support from family or other private sources, 
workers compensation awards, tort claim awards, insurance, pensions, 
food stamps, or other public assistance programs.196 Thus, because of 
“these potential sources of temporary income,” the first factor weighed 
in favor of constitutional sufficiency.197 
Members of the California Legislature are unable to draw upon 
many of the types of “potential sources” of temporary income 
described in Mathews.198 For one, legislators are not entitled to any 
pension or retirement benefits as part of their service.199 Conflict of 
interest laws further prevent legislators from: 1) obtaining any 
financial support from any lobbyist, lobbying firm, or any person who 
has been under contract with the Legislature in the last 12 months;200 
2) accepting an honorarium201 which is payment for making a speech, 
publishing an article, or attending any public or private gathering;202 
3) and receiving most, if not all, gifts.203 Article IV, Section 13 of the 
California Constitution additionally bars a state legislator from 
concurrently holding most other public offices while still a member of 
the Legislature.204 Even if a legislator chooses to resign, he or she is 
prohibited from entering the “revolving door” of lobbying for a full 12 
 
 194. Id. at 340. 
 195. Id. at 340–41. 
 196. Id. at 341. 
 197. Id. at 343. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 4.5 (“[A] person elected to or serving in the Legislature on or 
after November 1, 1990, shall participate in the Federal Social Security (Retirement, Disability, 
Health Insurance) Program and the State shall pay only the employer’s share of the contribution 
necessary to such participation. No other pension or retirement benefit shall accrue as a result of 
service in the Legislature, such service not being intended as a career occupation.”). 
 200. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 4(a). 
 201. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(b). 
 202. Gifts, Honoraria, Travel Payments, and Loans, CAL. FAIR POL. PRACT. COMM’N, 
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/learn/public-officials-and-employees-rules-/gifts-and-honoraria.html. 
 203. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(c). 
 204. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. 
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months, affecting the legislator’s income opportunities even after 
leaving office.205  
The Mathews court’s analysis seemingly ignores consideration of 
the cost of living. In its report entitled “2017 State Business Tax 
Climate Index,” the Tax Foundation rated California the third most 
unfavorable state in the nation for overall state tax systems.206 It has 
the highest top income tax207 and state sales tax rates in the country.208 
Unsurprisingly, California has the third highest median sales price of 
residential homes in the country.209 While California lawmakers 
receive the highest pay of any state legislators in the country,210 that 
pay does not go comparatively far due to the Golden State’s 
astronomical cost of living. Taken in conjunction with limitations on 
the manners of making a living available during a suspension, a 
member has a significant private interest at stake in the continued, 
uninterrupted receipt of salary and benefits. 
As Prop. 50’s critics have stated, “[m]any legislators come from 
modest means, and losing their legislative paycheck could force them 
out of office.”211 Accordingly, the first Mathews factor weighs against 
the sufficiency of Prop. 50 in its present form. 
2.  The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation is High Because Prop. 50 
Presently Provides Insufficient Safeguards, and the Proposed 
Additional Protections Would Reduce this Risk 
The second Mathews factor requires inquiry into “the risk of 
erroneous deprivation and the likely value of any additional 
procedures.”212 In Goldberg, welfare recipients challenged an 
administrative scheme which did not afford the recipients an in-person 
 
 205. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(e). 
 206. Scott Drenkard et. al, 2017 State Business Tax Climate Index,  
TAX FOUND. (2016), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6586UGJDFOLNU9XbGtVejJxZkU/view.  
 207. Specifically, California has a top income tax rate of 13.3%. Id. at 30. 
 208. Scott Drenkard & Nicole Kaeding, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2016, TAX FOUND. 
(Mar. 9, 2016), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/TaxFoundation_FF504.pdf. 
 209. National Home Prices Page, TRULIA (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.trulia.com/home 
_prices. 
 210. Jim Miller, California Panel Lifts Pay 4 Percent for Jerry Brown, Lawmakers, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (June 1, 2016, 11:50 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/ 
capitol-alert/article81143257.html. 
 211. The Times Editorial Board, Punishing Corrupt Politicians is Important, but Prop. 50 isn’t 
the way to do it, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/ 
endorsements/la-ed-proposition-50-20160420-story.html. 
 212. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 933 (1997). 
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evidentiary hearing prior to a decision to terminate benefits.213 The 
Court found that the current procedures, which only allowed recipients 
a written challenge to a proposed termination, carried a high risk of 
erroneously depriving recipients of their benefits because “where 
credibility and veracity are at issue, . . . written submissions are a 
wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.”214 In contrast, the Mathews 
court found that procedures carried a low risk of erroneous deprivation 
where the recipient was only entitled to challenge an initial decision 
to terminate disability benefits by a written submission.215 That is 
because the decision to discontinue disability benefits relied upon 
“routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician 
specialists”216 such as X-rays and clinical/laboratory tests, which are 
“information typically more amenable to written than to oral 
presentation.”217 A decision to suspend a legislator without pay 
necessarily involves credibility, veracity and testimony, rather than 
objective medical reports, and is thus more comparable to the situation 
in Goldberg than that in Mathews. 
With respect to procedure, Prop. 50 merely offers that “Each 
house may suspend a Member by motion or resolution adopted by 
rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership 
concurring. The motion or resolution shall contain findings and 
declarations setting forth the basis for the suspension.”218 As written, 
Prop. 50 makes no mention of whether an accused legislator has the 
power to appear personally, present evidence orally, examine 
witnesses, or even submit a written statement. Presumably, all that the 
statute requires is a two-thirds vote by the relevant house of the 
Legislature. That a chamber of the Legislature may suspend a member 
without first considering oral or written testimony highlights the 
substantial likelihood that a member may be erroneously deprived of 
a protected property interest. 
The changes to Prop. 50 proposed in this Article would 
undoubtedly reduce the risk of an erroneous decision. First, the right 
to appear personally and introduce exhibits is crucial because a 
legislator must be able to “mold his argument to the issues the decision 
 
 213. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 254 (1970). 
 214. Id. at 268–69. 
 215. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 345 (1976). 
 216. Id. at 344 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 217. Id. at 345. 
 218. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a)(2)(A). 
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maker appears to regard as important.”219 Second, allowing the 
legislator to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses is important 
because witnesses’ “memor[ies] might be faulty or . . . [witnesses] 
might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, 
intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.”220 Third, providing an accused 
legislator written notice of the pendency of a suspension hearing as 
well as access to examine and make copies of all evidence relevant to 
such a proceeding is necessary, “[o]therwise the individual likely 
would be unable to marshal evidence and prepare his case so as to 
benefit from any hearing that was provided.”221 Fourth, representation 
by legal counsel (if so desired) promotes an accurate result because 
“[c]ounsel can help delineate the issues, present the factual 
contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination, and 
generally safeguard the [client’s] interests[.]”222 Finally, requiring that 
any suspension hearing be open to the public promotes confidence in 
the integrity of the hearing,223 promotes the introduction of accurate 
evidence,224 and increases the likelihood that the officials will fairly 
conduct the hearing.225 
3.  The Proposed Additional Protections Would Impose Little to No 
Additional Fiscal and/or Administrative Burdens on the Government 
The final Mathews factor assesses the Government’s interest, 
including the administrative burden and societal costs associated with 
the additional procedures sought by the complainant.226 The Supreme 
Court has maintained that “the State has a significant interest in 
immediately suspending, when felony charges are filed against them, 
employees who occupy positions of great public trust and high public 
visibility, such as police officers.”227 On its face, this factor would 
seem to weigh in favor of Prop. 50’s constitutional sufficiency. 
 
 219. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269. 
 220. Id. at 270 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 221. Friendly, supra note 79, at 1280–81. 
 222. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270–71.  
 223. Friendly, supra note 79, at 1293 n. 132 (citing JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 335 (3d ed. 1940)).  
 224. Id. (citing 3 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373 (Wayne 
Morrison ed. 2001)). 
 225. Id. (citing JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 335 (3d ed. 1940)).  
 226. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 227. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997). 
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However, the proposed changes to Prop. 50 would not 
significantly increase the State’s administrative and/or financial costs, 
if at all. In fact, given that Prop. 50’s current language does not specify 
when the measure may be invoked, specifically limiting its application 
to circumstances where a legislator has been accused of criminal 
misconduct might actually reduce the State’s burden by decreasing the 
number of situations in which the additional proposed procedures 
would have to be offered. So too would bolstering Prop. 50’s 
procedural safeguards to dissuade would-be constitutional challengers 
from forcing the State to dedicate time, personnel, and money to 
defend the law and its application in Court.228 
At the outset, it is also important to note that the California 
legislature infrequently disciplines its members. Prior to the 
suspension of Senators Calderon, Wright, and Yee in March 2014, 
neither the California Senate nor the Assembly had ever before 
suspended a member.229 The last time a house expelled a legislator 
was in 1905, when the Senate expelled four members for taking 
bribes.230 It follows then that it is unlikely either chamber will 
regularly invoke Prop. 50, in which case there will rarely be a need to 
utilize the additional procedures proposed (or pay their costs). 
Moreover, the State Legislature has a combined 120 members.231 
With an estimated population of more than 39 million,232 Prop. 50 
directly affects less than 0.00031% of the State’s inhabitants. That is 
in stark contrast to the situation in Goldberg where the Court 
nonetheless found the existing procedures to be insufficient despite the 
Court’s acknowledgement that “requirement of a prior hearing 
doubtless involves some greater expense, and the benefits paid to 
ineligible recipients pending decision at the hearing probably cannot 
be recouped[.]”233 Taken together with the fact that Prop. 50 puts a 
 
 228. See Vas v. Roberts, 14 A.3d 766, 769 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (a suspended state 
legislator sought judicial review of the Speaker’s decision to suspend the legislator without pay). 
 229. Don Thompson, California Senate Suspends 3 Democratic Lawmakers, ORANGE CTY. 
REG. (Mar. 28, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/2014/03/28/california-senate-
suspends-3-democratic-lawmakers/. 
 230. Bribe-Takers are Expelled: State Senate Shows No Mercy to Quartet of Boodlers, 
SAUSALITO NEWS (Mar. 4, 1905), https://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=d&d=SN19050304.2.7. 
 231. See Legislators and Districts, CAL. ST. LEGISLATURE, http://www.legislature.ca.gov 
/legislators_and_districts.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
 232. QuickFacts California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/ 
PST045215/06 (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
 233. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970). But see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
348 (1976) (“[T]he Government’s interest . . . in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative 
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significant private interest at stake in legislators’ livelihoods, that 
Prop. 50’s current iteration does little to ensure that a just decision is 
reached and the changes detailed would foster accuracy and fairness, 
it is clear that Prop. 50 is flawed and the amendments offered provide 
the constitutional remedy. 
B.  Furtherance of Policy Goals 
Amending Prop. 50’s broad language would also serve several 
public policy goals. For one, explicitly limiting Prop. 50’s application 
to situations in which a legislator faces criminal charges would 
assuage critics who warn that legislative majorities could use the 
provision to hand down unpaid suspensions for political reasons.234 
Such an addition would ensure that the Proposition more closely 
conforms with its original statutory intent, having been created in the 
aftermath of the criminal sagas of Senators Calderon, Wright, and Yee 
in March 2014. Finally, imposing a maximum time limit on 
suspension under Prop. 50 of six months (one-quarter of an Assembly 
term or one-eighth of a Senate term), would avoid the imposition of 
“taxation without representation” for extended periods of time. 
C.  Methods of Enacting Proposed Changes 
The California Constitution can be amended in two ways: upon a 
two-thirds vote of each house, the Legislature may propose an 
amendment to the voters,235 or voters themselves may amend the 
Constitution through the initiative process.236 Either method requires 
statewide approval by a majority of votes.237 Thus, the Legislature 
could enact the proposed changes in the same way that Prop. 50 
became law, as a legislatively referred constitutional amendment. 
Conversely, the changes could take effect as an initiated constitutional 
amendment.238 
 
resources . . . must be weighed. At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the 
individual affected by the administrative action . . . may be outweighed by the cost.”). 
 234. The Times Editorial Board, supra note 211 (“The proposition also would not limit the use 
of this punishment to elected officials who are accused (or convicted) of breaking laws. . . . It 
doesn’t set any criteria for what transgressions would justify this punishment, [and an] . . . unpaid 
suspension could conceivably be used for political reasons.”). 
 235. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. 
 236. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. 
 237. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 4. 
 238. It is relatively easy to qualify a measure on the statewide ballot a proposition. See Charlene 
Wear Simmons, California’s Statewide Initiative Process, CAL. RES. BUREAU, CAL. ST. LIBR. 1 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Politicians often face the unenviable choice of picking between 
what is right and what is righteous. In the era of the outsider, where 
electoral survival may very well depend on an official’s ability to 
persuade voters of his or her dedication to rooting out corruption, 
inaction, and dysfunction, Prop. 50’s political expediency is apparent. 
Denying a legislator accused of criminal wrongdoing a paid vacation 
may be appealing, but the temptation alone does not make it legally 
permissible. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
ensures that no State may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law[.]”239 It protects welfare 
recipients and the disabled. And, despite the majority of voters who 
approved of Prop. 50 on the June ballot, it protects “crooked” 
politicians accused of lying on residency forms, misusing power to 
obtain jobs for relatives, participating in a drug and firearm ring, and 
even physically abusing a spouse. 
Judicial precedent makes clear that a legislator’s pay is “property” 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Once a benefit 
achieves protected status under the Constitution, the procedures for 
depriving that benefit become matters of federal law. That means that 
despite the intent of Prop. 50’s drafters to specify in the state 
Constitution that pay and benefits may be forfeited upon a two-thirds 
vote by either house of the Legislature, federal law is nonetheless 
controlling. And on that subject, federal law is abundantly clear that 
procedural due process requires notice and the opportunity to be heard, 
two areas where Prop. 50 is currently lacking. Amending Prop. 50 to 
guarantee legislators the rights to appear personally and introduce 
exhibits, to call/examine witnesses, to receive written notice of the 
pendency of suspension proceedings and access to all relevant 
evidence, to be represented by legal counsel, and to be allowed public 
 
(1997), https://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/06/97006.pdf (“[T]he number of constitutional 
initiatives has also increased, in part because of California’s relatively ‘easy’ qualification 
process.”); Maureen Cavanaugh & Michael Lipkin, Should California Change Its Voter Initiative 
Process?, KPBS (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2016/sep/06/ca-ballot-features-17-
initiatives/ (seventeen initiatives were on the November 2016 statewide ballot); Robert M. Stern, 
California’s Initiative Process Needs Reform—Not Repeal, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (July 11, 
2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.sandiegounion tribune.com/opinion/commentary/sdut-californias-
initiative-process-needs-reform-not-2015jul11-story.html (“It is too easy to qualify a measure if 
you have the money to do so (between $1 million and $2 million)[.]”). 
 239. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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observation of any proceedings would go a long way in transforming 
Prop. 50 from “righteous” to “right.” 
